




Structural Reforms and Growth
Eijffinger, S.C.W.; Rossi, A.
Publication date:
2006
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Eijffinger, S. C. W., & Rossi, A. (2006). Structural Reforms and Growth: Product and Labor Market
Deregulations. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2006-112). Macroeconomics.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.






















STRUCTURAL REFORMS AND GROWTH: PRODUCT AND 
LABOR MARKET DEREGULATIONS 
 


























Structural Reforms and Growth: Product and Labor Market Deregulations 
     
 
Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger 
Department of Economics 
CentER Tilburg University 
PO Box 90153 
5000 LE Tilburg 
THE NETHERLANDS 
Tel: (31 13) 466 2411 




Alberto G. P. Rossi, 
University of California, San Diego 
Department of Economics, 
9500 Gilman Drive  
La Jolla, California 
USA 




Department of Economics 














Structural Reforms and Growth: Product and Labor Market 
Deregulations 
 
The paper focuses on labor and product market deregulations, as fundamental elements in 
the passage from an investment to an innovation-based economy. The approach 
undertaken is prominently empirical. After a very brief description of the regulatory 
levels on the two sides of the Atlantic, we take two cornerstone theoretical models: one 
developed by Robert Gordon (1997), the other developed by Blanchard and Giavazzi 
(2003) and we observe how well their theoretical predictions are supported by hard data. 
We conclude with an independent study on the accuracy of the IMD competitiveness 
index in predicting the overall economic performance of countries close to the 
technological frontier. 
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Economic growth has always been at the center of any medium and long-run economic 
model. Unfortunately most of the factors driving it were assumed to be out of 
policymakers’ control: demographic growth, natural endowments, capital accumulation 
and other exogenous forces. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, on the other 
hand, more and more attention has been paid to the effect of political institutions on long-
run growth. Many authors led by Abramovits operated refinements of the basic catching 
up hypothesis claiming that backwardness “is not usually a mere accident”. Barriers in 
goods, capital and labor markets as well as inefficiencies at the institutional level were 
identified as possible obstacles to economic growth. Also Education and Human Capital 
were attributed an important role. Following Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky,1 
Abramovitz embraced all the barriers to change in society under the categorization of 
“social capability”. The lower the “barriers to change”, the higher the level of “social 
capability” and, consequently, “economic growth” potentials.  
Notwithstanding the many correct intuitions, early growth theorists had serious problems 
in the quantification and qualification of the so-called “social capability” for diverse 
reasons. Particularly hard to overcome was the endogeneity problem, which can be here 
synthesized as follows. “The more an economy is advanced, the more it has been subject 
to changes in the past. Changes are facilitated by a well developed “social capability”, but 
the reverse can be claimed to be true as well”.  Endogeneity inevitably affected a correct 
empirical estimation of the theoretical models. It impeded a correct understanding of 
growth dynamics and the formulation of effective economic policies.  
It was not until the beginning of the nineties that, thanks to conspicuous theoretical and 
empirical contributions of illustrious scholars of the caliber of Daron Acemoglu, Philippe 
Aghion and Olivier Blanchard (to name a few), we were able to shed some light on the 
main drivers of structural economic growth.    
A thorough understanding of the topic has invaluable potentials not only from a strictly 
academic point of view, but mainly from a policymaking one.  
 
1.1 What are the Ultimate Drivers of Economic Growth? 
 
A common characteristic of modern frameworks is that they identify a non-constant 
relationship between growth and its drivers: according to the different developmental 
stages, different factors are responsible for maintaining a high and sustainable level of 
growth. All the theoretical and empirical frameworks recognize that structural growth is 
strictly associated to Total Factor Productivity growth. As Aghion and Howitt (2004)2 
argue, TFP increases with the number and size of innovations introduced in the market.  
The implication is that, ultimately, economic growth rests on two pillars:  
- The stock of skilled human capital, which guarantees an innovative and effective 
research output. 
                                                 
1 Please refer to Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, 1973. “Japanese Economic Growth: Trend 
Acceleration in the Twentieth Century,” Stanford University Press.  
2 For a more detailed analysis, please refer to Aghion, Philippe and Peter Howitt, 2004. “Growth with 
Quality- Improving Innovations: An Integrated Framework,” Harvard University Working Paper  
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- A set of economic and political institutions that create the appropriate incentives 
for the agents to innovate and introduce the new technologies in the market. 
 
1.1.1  Education, Human Capital and Innovation: A Simple Model 
 
As far as the first pillar is concerned, the model presented by Aghion et al.3 (2004) can be 
considered one of the greatest recent contributions in the field. It is particularly relevant 
here as it helps in explaining the evolution of GDP per capita differentials between EU 
and US in the last 50 years. An analytical description of the model is out of the scope of 
the paper. For our purpose it will be enough to present its main ideas and policy 
implications.  
The model is based on the basic assumption that the source of technological progress is 
dual. It is the result of the adoption of existing technologies and of pure innovation. 
While the first is generally defined “imitation”, only the second is considered 
“innovation” strictu sensu. The authors reasonably assume that the two tasks typically 
require different types of workers. Unskilled human capital will dominate in imitation 
and skilled workers in innovation. Countries that are very close to the productivity 
frontier typically specialize in innovation while less developed countries concentrate in 
imitation only. The countries standing in the middle focus on both activities. Following 
the basic idea adopted by the Rybczynski theorem in international trade, the authors 
claim that when the amount of unskilled workers exogenously increase, the amount of 
unskilled individuals employed in imitation increase proportionally more than those 
employed in innovation. The consequence is that the marginal productivity of skilled 
workers in imitation increases more than in innovation; skilled workers naturally move 
from innovation to imitation and so even more unskilled labor goes to imitation. The final 
outcome is that the economy experiences an increase in employment for both categories 
of labor in “imitation” and a decrease in “innovation” . The opposite is the case for an 
exogenous increase in skilled workers. 
The implication of the model is that countries do not need to focus on skilled labor until a 
certain level of development, because relatively “useless”, while it becomes an absolute 
necessity after a certain point: i.e. where the domestic economy does not benefit anymore 
from the catch-up effect. Policymakers should work hard on their human capital in order 
to change their condition from technological followers to leaders.  
Finally, the authors also show that the positive relationship between economic growth 
and the stock of skilled human capital is stronger the closer the economy is to the world 
technological frontier. 
In the empirical section the authors construct panel dataset covering 19 OECD countries 
for the time-period 1960-2000. Because of the unavailability of the required data, they 
are not able to include less-advanced economies in their study. Therefore they are not 
able to prove empirically the totality of their model. Nevertheless they demonstrate that 
in advanced economies the potential for catching-up is very limited. Unskilled labor 
appears to contribute very little to technological growth, while skilled labor is 
significantly correlated to technological progress and is an important source of 
                                                 
3 The interested reader should refer to Aghion, Philippe, Costas Meghir, Jérôme Vandenbussche,  
2005."Growth, Distance to Frontier and Composition of Human Capital," CEPR Discussion Papers 4860 
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divergence in OECD economies. The authors obtain this result by regressing Total Factor 
Productivity against the “proximity” of each country to the technological frontier, the 
proportion of adults with tertiary education and some control variables like country 
dummies, time dummies and country-specific-effects. Across different model 
specifications and definitions of skilled and unskilled human capital, the authors 
consistently obtain a positive and significant correlation between TFP growth and the 
interaction effect between proximity and the proportion of adults in tertiary education, 
signifying that adults with tertiary education are more important for growth in economies 
closer to the frontier.  
 
1.1.2 Innovation and Market Structure   
 
In Aghion, Acemoglu and Zilibotti4 (2002) it is presented a model very similar to the one 
above. It is built following the same intuition that economies should stimulate growth 
differently according to their stage of development. 
The model relates the effectiveness of R&D to market structure and institutions. The 
authors claim that backward economies can grow rapidly by investing in, and adopting, 
already existing technologies: by pursuing what we call an “investment-based growth 
strategy”. This strategy should be kept as the highest priority and should be pursued even 
if it comes at the expense of market rigidities or a relatively less competitive 
environment. Post-war experiences of Japan and South Korea are taken as leading 
examples of this so-called “investment-based growth strategy”.   
Nevertheless, after reaching high levels of development, economies cannot grow 
anymore by just relying on other countries’ discoveries. The major source of growth 
becomes innovation and the economic policy should be tailored accordingly. Competitive 
markets, by adequately rewarding successful managers and firms as well as a variety of 
other innovation-type activities, are assumed to be the most powerful source of 
innovation and policy-makers should spend all their energies in ensuring their proper 
functioning.  
While in “investment-based growth strategy” is emphasized the role of long-term 
relationships between firms and banks, of large firms and of state intervention, 
“innovation-based growth” rests on market-based financing, venture capital, young firms, 
short-term relationships, less “centralized-investments” and better selection of managers.  
The choice between the two strategies resides ultimately in the trade-off between 
investment and experience, on the one hand, and selection, on the other. The investment-
based strategy guarantees the allocation of funds to established (and experienced) firms 
and managers. At the same time it shelters them from competition, with the result that 
inefficient and ineffective companies (and managers) are less likely to be driven out of 
the market. “It involves less selection of successful firms and managers, worse matches 
between agents and economic activities, and less innovative activity by new entrants”.5 
While investment and experience effects lead to a faster growth rate in backward 
economies, the selection effect is stronger the closer to the world technology frontier. 
                                                 
4 For a formal exposition, please refer to Acemoglu, Daron, Philippe Aghion and Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2002. 
“Distance to Frontier, Selection and Economic Growth,” NBER Working Paper No 9066 
 
5 Ibidem. Page 3 
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Under the regime of a benevolent social planner, economic growth could be maximized 
in every period by the adoption of appropriate institutions and policies, but as soon as we 
introduce the political equilibrium in the model it becomes clear that switching from one 
strategy to the other is harder than expected. In fact, investment-based growth enriches 
existing capitalists. Consequently, given that economic power buys political power,  we 
can expect a fierce and powerful resistance to any policy change by that particular 
interest group. The most straightforward implication is that state intervention stimulates 
economic growth for some time, but then the economy may get trapped with 
“inappropriate institutions” that impede its convergence to the world technology frontier. 
On the other hand innovation-based economies grow slowly when far from the frontier, 
but have higher chances of completing the catch-up. In the last 40 years Brazil, Mexico 
and Peru are typical examples of the first; Singapore and Hong Kong of the second.      
 
1.2  Contributions of the Paper 
 
The present paper focuses on the second of the pillars described above and out of the 
many economic and political institutions we have decided to focus the attention on labor 
and product market deregulations. Two are the reasons: first, because we believe it is the 
most important element in the passage from an investment to an innovation-based 
economy; secondly, because the two markets are strictly interrelated and analyzing them 
independently would not allow for a clear understanding of the subject at hand.   
The approach undertaken is prominently empirical. After a very brief description of the 
regulatory levels on the two sides of the Atlantic, we take two cornerstone theoretical 
models: one developed by Robert Gordon6(1997), the other developed by Blanchard and 
Giavazzi7 (2003) and we observe how well their theoretical predictions are supported by 
hard data. The paper concludes with an independent study on the accuracy of the IMD 
competitiveness index in predicting the overall economic performance of countries close 
to the technological frontier.  
 
 
2 Product and Labor Market Regulation 
 
2.1 Product Market Regulation 
 
Product market regulation is usually referred to as a combination of numerous elements, 
usually related to the degree of privatization and level of competition in a given 
economy. Following intuition, the more privatized and the higher the level of competition 
in a given market, the more it is considered deregulated. 
                                                 
6 Please refer to Gordon Robert J., 1997. “Is there a trade-off between unemployment and productivity 
Growth?,” in D. Snower and G. de la Dehesa, eds, Unemployment Policy: government Options for the 
Labor Market. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press. 
7 For a better understanding of the subject at hand, please refer to Blanchard, Olivier and Francesco 
Giavazzi, 2003. “Macroeconomic effects of regulation and deregulation in goods and labor markets,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics,118(3): 879{909}  
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The eighties were characterized by wide regulatory divergences across countries. For 
example, 20-30 per cent of non-agricultural GDP of Europe, Ireland and New Zealand 
was produced by state-owned enterprises. The same figure for US, Japan and Switzerland 
oscillated around 1 and 10 per cent. Between 1984 and 1998 most of the Anglo-Saxon 
countries like New Zealand, UK and Australia went through a very strong process of 
privatization, while continental Europe, with the exception of Portugal, did not go 
through such a radical transformation. In the last fifteen years under consideration, the 
different starting points were still reflected at the end of the period. In fact, most of the 
Anglo-Saxon countries were already at an “advantage” compared to continental Europe 
and those that weren’t, like Ireland and New Zealand, managed to deregulate very 
quickly.  
The most recent comprehensive assessment of product market regulation is the one 
conducted by Nicoletti, Scarpetta8 et al. (2000). The authors identify three patterns of 
product-market regulation. The first group/cluster includes mostly Continental European 
countries. They are characterized by relatively liberal policies as far as international trade 
and international investments are concerned, but pursue a more interventionist and 
restrictive approach regarding state control and barriers to entrepreneurship (also called 
inward policies). The second group comprises Anglo-Saxon countries that have a more 
hands-off approach in both in-ward and out-ward oriented policies. Finally the third 
group is composed of relatively heterogeneous countries. Norway and Greece have very 
strict regulatory frameworks both inward and outward. Italy is very restrictive at home, 
but very open to the international markets. The opposite is for Canada. 
 
2.2 Labor Market Regulation 
 
Given that labor is the main input for the production of goods and services, a correct 
functioning of its market is certainly a key element to be considered by policymakers.    
Labor markets are directly and indirectly affected by a large number of regulations. Here 
we will only consider one aspect of it, i.e. Employment Protection Legislation. The 
reason is that it is a very good proxy for the overall level of labor markets regulation. 
Furthermore, it was not possible to obtain studies embracing organically all the aspects 
that constitute labor market regulations like unemployment benefits, levels of minimum 
wage etc…  
By EPL, it is usually meant restrictions on firing such as severance payments, mandatory 
notice periods, administrative procedures and delays. According to the EU’s Broad 
Economic Policy guidelines, Member states are invited to “review employment contract 
regulations and, where appropriate, related costs, with the aim of promoting more jobs 
and striking a proper balance between flexibility and security”9 
Recent studies show that Anglo-Saxon countries like UK, USA, Ireland and Canada have 
very liberal markets on both temporary and long-term contracts. The markets are very 
strictly regulated in continental Europe with countries like Italy, Germany and France 
having very high employment protection legislation levels in both types of contracts. 
                                                 
8 For the complete analysis, please refer to Nicoletti, Giuseppe, Stefano Scarpetta, and Olivier Boylaud, 
2000. “Summary indicators of product market regulation with an extension to employment protection 
legislation,” Economics Department Working Paper 226, OECD. 
9 Council Recommendation. 21st  June 2002.  
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Other countries like Sweden and the Netherlands score very well in temporary and 
relatively badly in long-term ones.  
Almost half of the countries enacted EPL reforms in the 8 year time-span under 
consideration. Apart from France which increased the overall level of protection, all the 
other countries worked in the other direction. Greater attention was given to temporary 
contracts, most likely because of the laxer political constraints compared to the reforms 
that touch long-term ones. The reason stands in the fact that unions are sustained and 
financed by the employed workers, which are mainly under permanent working contracts: 
in order to provide companies for some degree of flexibility in their hiring and laying off 
schemes, each state had to reform the sectors of the labor market that were less defended 
by lobbies. Even though not optimal, this approach usually led to some benefits from an 
efficiency point of view. On the other hand, countries like Italy, with very strong 
restrictions on permanent contracts and relatively low on temporary have now a divided 
labor market: the young workforce is under temporary contracts while the elderly are 
under very safe employment conditions, with the obvious social tensions that result from 
it. The hope is that in the future it will be possible to diminish the EPL levels on long-
term contracts all over the EU. 
 
2.3 Where do We Stand? 
 
The theoretical models illustrated in the first section of the paper highlight the importance 
of competitive goods and labor markets for productivity and economic growth in 
advanced economies. Unfortunately the empirical assessments conducted on both sectors 
highlight that continental Europe is still behind in the deregulation process compared to 
its direct rivals US and Japan. The entire set of economic and political institutions 
established during what Acemoglu and Aghion would define as the “investment period” 
appear now to be very strong barriers to the needed restructuring process.  
The rest of the paper will focus on the empirical estimation of some key relationships 
entailed by well-known theoretical models between regulation, employment and 
productivity. In particular, it tries to disproof one widely shared misconception: that 
higher unemployment may potentially lead to higher productivity growth. It tries to 
estimate the effects of regulation on overall employment and it concludes with an 
analysis of the effects of product and labor market regulation on long-run growth. The 
findings should work at clarifying some ideas within the research community as well as 
help the policy-makers in working in a sensible direction to increase European 
competitiveness on the international scene 
 
 
3 Unemployment and Productivity Trade-Off 
 
In this section we estimate a model from Robert Gordon on the trade-off between 
unemployment and productivity growth. This proves helpful in the analysis of European 
and American GDP per capita and productivity growth performance over the past 
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decades. Europe has shown a large increase in output per hour10 with respect to the US. 
Most of the commentators claim it is the result of the stronger product and labor market 
regulation in the old Continent: the restrictions in place are deemed to increase 
unemployment with the consequent exclusion of least productive individuals from 
employment.  
Because the final aim of policy-makers is the welfare of the citizens and because the 
GDP per capita measures are a relatively poor proxy of society’s well being, alternative 
measures have been adopted, like output per hour11. On this regard, many academics 
believe in the existence of a long-run trade-off between unemployment and productivity. 
A very important consequence for policymakers is that they might be tempted to accept 
high unemployment levels with the idea of speeding productivity growth. 
The main contribution of Gordon’s model is the analysis of the dynamic effects of the so-
called “structural shocks”, defined as reform attempts in the labor or goods markets. In its 
theoretical framework, it is shown that there is a trade-off between productivity and 
employment in the short-run. In the long–run a dynamic path of adjustments involving 
capital accumulation or de-cumulation leads to the elimination of such trade-off. The 
bottom line is that deregulation leads to lower unemployment levels, but does not slow 
down productivity growth. Unfortunately, as described below, the author’s empirical 
findings are relatively disappointing.      
In the next section we present an empirical estimation of Gordon’s theoretical 
conclusions and we compare it to the findings he presented in his original paper. The 
hope is to clarify some of the doubts still present in the current debate.  
 
3.1 An Empirical Analysis of the Relationship between 
Unemployment and Productivity  
 
3.1.1 Means and Variances of Output per Hour 
 
Gordon12 tests empirically its model by collecting data regarding growth rates of output 
per hour and of Multi-factor productivity (or Total Factor Productivity) for the period 
1960-1992. Some of the main features of the data are summarized in Figure 1 below. It 
displays means and variances of output per hour across nine sectors for seven countries. 
The averages show a productivity slowdown in the period 1973-1979 across all countries, 
due to the oil shocks of the seventies. Some countries, like Canada, US and Japan 
managed to recover after the shock and they were able to have a higher productivity 
growth during 1979-92 than 1973-1979. This was not the case for the four European 
                                                 
10 For a more in-depth analysis, please refer to Gordon, Robert J., 2004. "Two Centuries of Economic 
Growth: Europe Chasing the American Frontier," NBER Working Papers 10662, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Inc. Page 4 
11 For a thorough discussion, please refer Gordon, Robert J., 2004. "Two Centuries of Economic Growth: 
Europe Chasing the American Frontier," NBER Working Papers 10662, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Inc. 
12 Please refer to Gordon Robert J., 1997. “Is there a trade-off between unemployment and productivity 
Growth?” in D. Snower and G. de la Dehesa, eds, Unemployment Policy: government Options for the 




countries under consideration that experienced lower productivity growth after 1979 than 
during 1973-1979. European countries maintained anyways a higher level of productivity 
growth compared to Canada and US over the eighties. The most common interpretation 
of these figures is that the prior 1970 catch-up effect was relatively strong. As soon as the 
various countries got closer to the American technological frontier the productivity 











Figure 1: Growth Rates of Output per Hour, Mean and Variance by Country. 
Source: Gordon Robert J., 1997. “Is there a trade-off between unemployment and productivity Growth?” in 
D. Snower and G.de la Dehesa, eds, Unemployment Policy: government Options for the Labor Market. 
Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press. Page 56 
 
The theoretical analysis presented in Gordon’s paper treated an increase in TFP as an 
exogenous event. As explicitly stated by equation 1.1 reported below,  
))(1( hkahq ∆−∆−+∆=∆−∆ α   (3.1) 
Gordon decomposes the observed growth rate of output per hour between growth of TFP 
( D) and the contribution of the growth in capital per hour [(1-  N– K@IRUWKHQRQ-
farm private business sector. His results are reported in Figure 2 below. The data seem to 
be consistent with one of the key aspects of Gordon’s model, i.e. capital accumulation/de-
cumulation. Most of the growth in the output per hour in US and Canada was in fact due 
to an increase in capital accumulation that increased very rapidly over the period. The 
exact opposite is true for European countries that after 1979 experienced a large decrease 
in investments. While output per hour growth in Europe was mainly driven by Total 












Figure 2: Growh Rates of Output per Hour, the Contribution of Capital and Mutli-Factor Productivity 
Source: Ibidem. Page 57.  
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“This supports the emphasis placed […] on the role of wage-setting shocks in setting into 
motion a process of capital de-cumulation, while also causing an increase in 
unemployment”.13  
 
3.1.2 Productivity Growth Regressions 
 
The theoretical framework presented predicts that the correlation between change in 
unemployment and growth rate of productivity can be positive (in the short-run after a 
wage- setting shock), negative (always in the short-run after an oil shock) and zero (in the 
long-run). The framework makes only one sure prediction: the negative correlation 
between the change in unemployment and the change in capital per employee. Gordon 
tries to observe the aforementioned interrelations through a set of different regression 
equations. The dependent variables are alternatively growth in output per hour, growth in 
capital per member of the labor force and growth in MFP. Each variable is measured over 
the three time intervals reported in figure 1 and 2. The explanatory variables are a set of 
dummies comprising country effects, sector effects and time effects. Two economic 
variables are also included: 
- The level of productivity of each country with respect to US at the beginning of a 
particular interval. The sign of such coefficient is expected to be negative, 
according to the catch-up effect.  
- The change in a country’s unemployment rate. 
Here is the regression equation as presented by the author:  
 







210    (3.2) 
DC= set of country dummies  DS=is a set of sector dummies          DT= set of interval dummies 
 
The regression results are presented in Figure 3. Column one and two differ only in the 
fact that (1) excludes the “country-sector level effect”. Including it substantially reduces 
the size of country dummies indicating that the more rapid productivity growth in Europe 
compared to the US can be attributed to the “convergence effect”.  
The exclusion of “unemployment change” from the explanatory variables in column (3) 
further reduces the size of the country effects, indicating that the high values of country 
effects in column (1) and (2) offset the negative coefficient of the “change in 
unemployment” for the European countries.  
The coefficient for unemployment change is insignificant both in (1) and (2). Some 
sectors’ coefficients are highly significant, indicating a high variability of growth rates in 
the different sectors across countries. Finally, time effects are significant only in (3), 
where “change in unemployment” is excluded from the explanatory variables. For this 
reason, the author claims that in (1) and (2) “productivity slowdown is spuriously 
explained by the increase in unemployment”. 
                                                 
13 Ibidem. Page 37 
 
 11
In column (4) the dependent variable is “capital per potential hours”, where potential 
hours are defined as “the hours that would have been worked if a country had the 
unemployment rate at the beginning of the period rather than at the end of the period”.14  
Productivity with respect to the US enters negatively with the expected coefficient and 
even the change in unemployment coefficient is significant and with the expected sign 
(the higher the unemployment, the lower the marginal productivity of capital and the 
lower capital investments). 
  
Figure 3: Regression Equations Explaining Growth Rates by Country and Sector, Three Intervals, 1960-92  
Note : * Indicates that coefficient is significant at 5 percent level, ** at 1 percent level 
Source: Ibidem. Page 57.  
Country specific dummies for the European countries show that part of the higher 
productivity growth of Europe is due to the higher capital accumulation (holding constant 
the change in their unemployment rates). Unexpectedly time dummies are not significant: 
capital accumulation effects are entirely explained by country-sector productivity 
variables and unemployment changes. Finally, the estimated results for sector specific 
coefficients are relatively hard to rationalize. Although equation (4) is able to represent 
the catch-up effect of Europe with respect to US and is also able to explain the slowdown 
in capital accumulation after an increase in unemployment, there are numerous factors, 
like the insignificance of time and sector-specific coefficients that leave us relatively 
partially dissatisfied with the regression results. 
                                                 
14 Ibidem. Page 40 
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In column 5 the dependent variable is MFP. Two aspects of this regression outcome are 
worth being highlighted. Firstly, the only country-specific coefficient is the one for Italy. 
Secondly, the time-specific dummy coefficients suggest that between 2/3 and 3/4 of the 
productivity slow-down in column (3) can be attributed to a slowdown in MFP growth 
and the rest to a slow-down in capital accumulation due to higher unemployment rates. 
Gordon’s empirical estimations were able to successfully isolate the catch-up effect and 
the effect of unemployment on capital accumulation. His regression equations were not 
able to find a significant relationship between unemployment and labor productivity. This 
is because apart from the numerous wage-setting shocks, the period under consideration 
was dominated by oil price shocks: while the first mostly create a positive correlation 
between unemployment and productivity, the latter a negative one. As a result the period 
under consideration does not allow for the identification of a significant relationship 
among the two variables at hand. This is the starting point of our independent empirical 
investigation thoroughly described in the next section.  
 
3.2 Labor Productivity and Unemployment 
 
This section was inspired by the inconclusiveness of Gordon’s findings on the 
relationship between unemployment and labor productivity, which was one of the key 
elements of his theoretical model. As explained above, the lack of a significant 
relationship between the two could be attributed to the time-period considered (1960-
1992). For this reason we have decided to conduct our research on a different period, i.e. 
1981-2004. This period allows us to exclude most of the effects of the oil-shocks that 
strongly affected Gordon’s study. On the other hand, the sample period should be able to 
represent the effects of the strong-wage setting shocks that occurred during the ‘70s and 
‘80s in US and EU. As a consequence we would expect a short-run strong positive 
relationship between unemployment and labor productivity. This significant positive 
relationship is expected to nullify in the long-run due to a slowdown in capital 
accumulation. 
 
3.2.1 The Data 
 
Following Gordon’s Model, we focused on two variables: the “Change in 
Unemployment” and the “Change in Labor Productivity”.  The first is the change from 
year to year in unemployed individuals as a percentage of total labor force. Labor 
productivity is defined as GDP per hour worked, where GDP for each country refers to its 
Gross Domestic Product, in national currency, at constant prices, OECD base year 2000. 
The measures of labor productivity are presented as rates of change as well.  
The source of the entire sample is the OECD database. Given the scarce availability of 
productivity data, only advanced countries were included in the sample: i.e. Australia, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and Unites States. 
This does not entail any significant loss given that the theoretical framework aimed at 
explaining the differential unemployment and productivity paths between EU and US. 
Data were collected for the period 1981-2004.  
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3.2.2 The Model and the Regression 
 
The empirical model to be proposed analyses the statistical relationship between the 
“Change in Labor Productivity” and the “Change in Unemployment”. As in Gordon’s 
model, the first is taken as the dependent variable. A panel data model is used. We  use 
country-specific and time-specific fixed effects because the individual effects are 
correlated with the regressors. When running the regression on the entire sample, we 
have a total of 391 observations. We have only one model specification and we test it 
across different time periods as specified below: 
 
( ) ktt tkkktkt DTDCUhq εβαα +++∆+=∆−∆ ∑∑10      (3.3) 
 
The results of the regression conducted over the period 1981-2004 are reported below in 
figure 4. 
Country Fixed and Period fixed effects estimations are not reported in the table. The 
reason is simply that their role is to reduce the amount of spurious correlation between 
the changes in unemployment and labor productivity. The coefficient for unemployment 
is positive and significant. Given the relative wide time-span (23 years), we were 
expecting it to be insignificant in the long-run as predicted by Gordon’s theoretical 
framework. By reducing the time-span to ten years (1981-1990), the coefficient for 
“unemployment change” increases its value to 0.459 and maintains its significance at 1% 
level. By reducing it to six years, the coefficient increases further to 0.599 with no 
changes in significance.   
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
Constant 2.047612 0.076246 26.85550 0.0000 
Unemployment change 0.327083 0.091163 3.587901 0.0004 
     
 Effects Specification   
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
R-squared 0.304471     F-statistic 3.939794 
Adjusted R-squared 0.227190     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.698663   
Figure 4:  Regression results for the relationship between change in unemployment and productivity per 
hour. Time and country effects omitted from the table and available on request 
 
This seems to agree with Gordon’s predictions: after the bulk of wage-setting shocks 
during the seventies and beginning of the eighties, the longer the period into 
consideration, the lower the effects of changes in unemployment on labor productivity. In 
principle, if we could have another ten/fifteen years of sample after 2004 without major 
reforms attempts or economic shocks, we could observe the coefficient for 
“unemployment change” decrease further and eventually become insignificant. This can 
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be noticed already if we take the years 1995-2003 as a sample. The coefficient for 
“unemployment change” is now positive but insignificant: the increase in unemployment 
during this last time-span was not accompanied by an increase in labor productivity.  
 
3.2.3 Findings and Concluding Remarks 
 
The results of our empirical research seem to be in line with Blanchard’s findings15, i.e. 
after 1995 the growth in output per hour (intended as TFP) has strongly decreased in 
Europe, while it has picked up in US. Some analysts attribute it to the end of the 
catching-up or convergence effect. This interpretation is certainly true, but another effect 
worked in the same direction: the slowdown in capital investments in the EU and its 
increase in US over the last two decades of the twentieth century. This reasoning is 
confirmed by the fact that capacity utilization has not decreased in Europe over the period 
at hand meaning that, after strong disinvestments, the current level of capital is not able 
to fully employ the labor force.  
As far as the possible critiques to the present study are concerned, it may be argued that 
the limited amount of variables utilized could make us suspicious about the soundness of 
the results obtained. On the other hand, it is relatively hard to find a limited amount of 
control variables and, in his estimations, Gordon himself mainly relied on time and 
country effects.   
To conclude, the empirical results obtained prove the economic soundness of the 
theoretical model introduced by Gordon. They also confirm that the time period used in 
his study was responsible for the failure in proving any significant relationship between 
changes in unemployment and productivity. The next section is dedicated to the empirical 
estimation of one key conclusion of Blanchard and Giavazzi’s framework: i.e. product 
market deregulations affect positively employment16.  
 
4 Product Market Regulation and Employment 
 
Following the classification and scheme presented by Nicoletti, Scarpetta et al.17, product 
market regulation is commonly analyzed among three axes: state control, barriers to 
entrepreneurship and barriers to trade and investments. The definition of employment 
rates is “the percentage of employed individuals over total working-age population”. The 
approach by Nicoletti et al.18 (2001) and Boeri et al19 (2000) has been to draw inferences 
                                                 
15 Blanchard, Olivier, 2004. "The Economic Future of Europe," NBER Working Papers 10310, National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 
16 For a thorough discussion, please refer to Blanchard, Olivier and Francesco Giavazzi, 2003. 
“Macroeconomic effects of regulation and deregulation in goods and labor markets,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 118(3): 879{909}. 
17 For further reference, please refer to Nicoletti, Giuseppe, Stefano Scarpetta, and Olivier Boylaud, 
2000.“Summary indicators of product market regulation with an extension to employment protection 
legislation,” Economics Department Working Paper 226, OECD. 
18 Nicoletti, Giuseppe, Andrea Bassanini, Ekkehard Ernst, Sébastien Jean, Paulo Santiago and Paul Swa, 
2001. “Product and labour markets interactions in OECD countries,” OECD Economics Department 
Working Papers 312, OECD Economics Department. 
19 Boeri, Tito, Giuseppe Nicoletti and Stefano Scarpetta, 2000. "Regulation And Labour Market 
Performance," CEPR Discussion Papers 2420. 
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on the relationship at hand via simple bivariate correlations between the employment rate 
and goods markets regulation at a given point in time: 1998 in Nicoletti et al. (2001) and 
1995 in Boeri et al (2000). Both studies focused on the non-agricultural business sector. 
In Nicoletti et al. the authors also analyze the relationship over time, but they lack clarity 
in explaining the procedure adopted, claiming only that they use a “time-series index”. 
Both studies analyze further the relationship through different model specifications and 
using different sets of control variables, but their approach is not very satisfying as 
explained below. The present section illustrates their findings and tries to extend them via 
a panel data study as detailed below.  
 
4.1 Bivariate Correlations’ Findings and other Empirical Results 
 
The employment and labor markets bivariate correlations obtained by the aforementioned 
authors are reported in figure 5 and 6 A&B.  As clearly highlighted by the figures below, 
the authors obtain almost the same negative relationship between employment rate and 
product market regulation when using different time periods and data sets.  
But through bivariate correlations we are not able to determine if an increase in product 
market regulation leads to a decrease in employment rate and vice versa. The bivariate 
correlations, in fact, just tell that countries with high product market regulation are 
associated with lower employment rates, but there might be no causality between the two 
variables or, more importantly, another factor may move them in the same direction. 
The two studies go on running an empirical investigation on the determinants of 
employment rate. The aim is to check if product market regulation is significant and with 
























Figure 5: Employment rate in the non-agricultural business sector and regulation, 1995 
Source: Boeri, Tito, Giuseppe Nicoletti and Stefano Scarpetta, 2000. "Regulation And Labour Market 
Performance," CEPR Discussion Papers 2420. Page 24 
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Boeri et al. (2000) did not dispose of detailed information regarding the evolution of 
product market regulation over time. For this reason, they decide to conduct a panel data 
for the period 1982-1995 excluding “product market regulation” from the set of 
explanatory variables. Apart from the common institutional and non-institutional 
explanatory variables (i.e. “level of unemployment benefits”, “union density”, “tax 
wedge” etc…), the authors decide also to include country-specific effects 
Figure 6 A: Employment rate in the non-agricultural business sector and regulation, 1998 
Source: Nicoletti et al., 2001 “Product and Labour Markets Interactions in OECD Countries” Economics 
Department Working Papers No. 312. Page 47   
 
Figure 6 B: Employment rate in the non-agricultural business sector and regulation, Time-Series index 
Source: Ibidem. Page 47 
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Given that fixed effects pick-up the variation not explained by the variables included in 
the model, the authors regress the country-specific effects against product market 
regulation (State control, Barriers to Entrepreneurship and Barriers to Trade and 
Investments). A strong relationship between country-specific effects and product market 
regulation, in fact, would indirectly prove the relationship between the latter and 
employment. Unfortunately the results obtained are disappointing. Out of eight 
explanatory variables embracing different aspects of product market regulation, only two 
are significant at ten percent level and with the expected sign. The authors claim that the 
insignificance of the coefficients can be attributed to the fact that there is a very high 
correlation (multi-collinearity) between product and labor market regulation. Therefore 
the effect of the first is not present in country-specific effects, because taken away by the 
latter. 
Nicoletti et al. (2001) instead conduct a panel data study using “product market 
regulation” as one of the explanatory variables. The authors constructed the index for 
each country through an analysis of seven sample energy and service industries for the 
period 1970-1998. “Employment rates were related to the economy-wide and time-series 
indicators of the stringency of product market regulations controlling for a number of 
other policy and institutional factors that have been identified in the literature as 
contributing to the equilibrium level of employment”20. Several model specifications 
were attempted with no qualitative differences in the results. The best model specification 
is a standard panel data with a time-varying indicator for product market regulation. 
Reported below in Figure 7 are the results for three versions of the latter specification as 
well as for two versions of a basic specification (that excludes Product Market Regulation 
from the regressors). As far as the control variables are concerned, we can see that the 
coefficients are relatively homogeneous across the different model specifications. Tax 
wedges and unemployment benefits do not appear to have a decisive impact, while the 
effect of unionization is consistently strong. 
As expected the impact of EPL on employment rates is negative, with the impact being 
stronger when the state is characterized by an intermediate degree of centralization/co-
ordination.  
The effect of product market regulation on employment is negative and highly 
significant. From the table below we can also appreciate the interaction between product 
market regulation and the other explanatory variables in the model. The coefficient for 
“EPL” is halved when we include product market regulation to the basic model 
specification. The coefficient for “tax wedge” instead becomes significant. Finally, 
product market regulation appears to be less harmful when associated with highly 
corporatist labor market regimes. 
Unluckily the authors do not specify what they exactly mean by “time varying indicator”, 
and they do not even specify which estimators are used. In the appendix, there is a 
discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of using OLS or GLS estimators in this 
type of studies, but it is not clearly stated which estimator is used in which case. Even if 
not explicitly stated, it seems that all the variables in the model are expressed in nominal 
values. Time-series data are affected by an autocorrelation of the error term that, if not 
                                                 
20 Nicoletti, Giuseppe, Andrea Bassanini, Ekkehard Ernst, Sébastien Jean, Paulo Santiago and Paul Swa, 
2001. “Product and labour markets interactions in OECD countries,” OECD Economics Department 
Working Papers 312, OECD Economics Department. Page 45 
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corrected, might result in an overestimation of the significance of the model as well as of 
the individual coefficients. The authors do not report thoroughly the estimation 
procedure, and this casts some doubts on the approach as well as on the accuracy of the 
results. The objective of the next section is to conduct a study similar to the ones just 
presented, but following a different approach. It allows us to check the robustness of the 
results obtained by the previous models and gain a clearer understanding of the effects of 






































Note: t-statistics are in brackets.*,** denote significance at 5% and 1% respectively 
Figure 7: Labor and Product market determinants of the non-agricultural employment rate, 1982-1998 
Source: Ibidem. Page 49   
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4.2 Product Market Regulation and Unemployment  
 
The current study differs with respect to the ones presented above, because it focuses on 
the relationship between product market regulations and unemployment (not 
employment) over time. We decided to use unemployment rates because many 
social/cultural variables other than economic conditions affect employment rates. By 
using unemployment data, in fact, we are able to avoid some “social” control variables 
that, because non quantitative, are very hard to find and use in this sort of studies. On the 
other hand we lose a bit in precision, because changes in unemployment rates might be 
dictated by factors other than the change in the number of employed individuals, like a 
decrease (increase) in the number of people actively looking for a job. The 
autocorrelation affecting time-series data has been eliminated first by including fixed 
effects in the regression (within transformation) and secondly by using the absolute 
changes of the variables at hand instead of their nominal values (first differencing 
approach).  
 
4.2.1 The Data and the Model  
 
The data collected comprised unemployment data for the time period 1978-1998. 
Unluckily it was impossible to find a complete database. For this reason, the OECD 
database has been used as a base and it has been integrated with the ESDS database for 
the years missing. The data regarding product market regulation were taken from 
Nicoletti et al.21 (2001). Unfortunately product market regulation assessments are not 
very frequent. The authors estimate them in intervals of 4-5 years for two main reasons. 
Firstly, the assessment is a very long and cumbersome procedure; secondly, the changes 
between one year and another are very small and negligible. The problem for the 
econometric study at hand is that even if the period considered is relatively long (20 
years), the observations per country are only 5.The countries for which the data are 
available are 21, so we have a total of 105 data points when using nominal values and 84 
when using the absolute changes (we lose the first year). The number of observations are 
relatively low for a panel data and this is surely one important source of concern.  
The econometric study will first just estimate the relationship between unemployment 
(dependent variable) and product market regulation (explanatory variable). Then time-
specific effects will be added. The final step will be to include country-specific effects 
too. Before describing the regression results, it is due to highlight some important 
elements that determined the choice of the specific models used.  
Given that we use fixed and not random effects, we cannot use any control variable that 
is not country-specific, because it would be reflected only in the constant. This rules out 
the usage of many common and powerful control variables like “oil price” or “world 
economic growth”. Given the very strong correlation between labor and product market 
institutions (explicitly shown in the next section)22, we know that by adding the first as 
control variable, we lose some of explanatory power of the latter. Furthermore it was not 
                                                 
21 Nicoletti, Giuseppe, Andrea Bassanini, Ekkehard Ernst, Sébastien Jean, Paulo Santiago and Paul Swa, 
2001. “Product and labour markets interactions in OECD countries,” OECD Economics Department 
Working Papers 312, OECD Economics Department. Page 45 
22 Please refer to paragraph 4.3  
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possible to obtain data regarding “Labor Markets Regulations” for the same years as the 
ones for “Product Market Regulations”. 
  
4.2.2 Regression Results 
 
The results for the first specification 
 
ktktkt REGU εαα ++= 10  (3.4) 
indicate a positive and very significant correlation between regulatory levels and 
unemployment, but the Durbin-Watson test highlights a strong positive autocorrelation of 
the error terms, which makes us reject the validity of the results obtained.  
The second specification 
ktt tktkt
DTREGU εαα +++= ∑10   (3.5) 
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
C 4.667160 1.274829 3.661008 0.0004 
Regulatory level 0.562024 0.292980 1.918301 0.0580 
Fixed Effects (Period) 
1—C -2.329904 3—C -0.459633  
2—C -0.790941 4—C 2.363814  
  5—C 1.216664  
     
 Effects Specification   
     
Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
R-squared 0.136510     F-statistic 3.130209 
Adjusted R-squared 0.092900     Prob(F-statistic) 0.011501 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.453104   
     
     Figure 8: Panel data results. Unemployment against product market regulation and period fixed effects.   
 
indicates an almost 5% significance of the product market explanatory variable. Although 
the relationship is relatively strong, we observe that the Durbin-Watson test still 
highlights a serial autocorrelation of the error terms. For this reason we are not able to 
claim that product market regulation affects unemployment rates.  
Finally, the third specification  
 
ktt tkkktkt







     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
C 5.907546 2.358383 2.504914 0.0143 
Regulatory level 0.272986 0.547601 0.498513 0.6195 
     
 Effects Specification   
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
R-squared 0.773787     F-statistic 10.80914 
Adjusted R-squared 0.702201     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.726629   
     
     Figure 9: Panel data results. Unemployment against product market regulation, period fixed effects & 
country fixed effects.    
 
highlights the insignificance of the “product market regulation” coefficient. This result 
indicates its strong correlation with other country specific variables like GDP, but also 
unemployment benefits, labor market regulation, EPL etc… Furthermore, now the 
Durbin-Watson test indicates no autocorrelation and this makes us believe that indeed the 
significant relationship between unemployment and product market regulation found 
before was spurious or, in any case, very hard to isolate.  
When we repeat the same procedure using not the nominal values, but the changes over 
time of both unemployment and product markets regulation (not reported), we were not 
able to obtain a significant coefficient for the explanatory variable under any model 
specification, while the Durbin-Watson tests showed at all times that the error terms were 
not autocorrelated.  
The results show that it is very hard to prove the relationship between employment and 
product market regulation. Although theoretically the relationship appears to be clear and 
precise, it cannot be claimed to be contained in the data at hand.  
The disappointing results can be due to a number of reasons. First of all, in this kind of 
studies one of the variables is made out of quantitative data, the other is an index based 
on the aggregation of hard and soft, qualitative and quantitative data. As a consequence 
the index for “Product Market Regulation” used might not be precise enough to be 
econometrically significant.  
Another source of concern is given by the fact that “Product Markets Regulation” was 
estimated at 4-5 years intervals. This did not allow for the use of any lags in the 
explanatory variables. The fact that only 5 data points for each nation were available  
increases further the difficulty in obtaining a significant relationship between the 
variables at hand.  
Finally, product market regulation is correlated (multi-collinear) to many other economic 
and institutional indicators. This makes it very hard to prove its significance once used 





4.2.3 Concluding Remarks  
 
As a whole, we were not able to fully support empirically the theoretical developments of 
the model presented by Blanchard and Giavazzi. Out of the two studies presented, only 
the one by Nicoletti et al. (2001) showed a significant relationship between the variables 
at hand. Their approach, but, is not very well explained and some further analysis would 
be required. The findings by Boeri et al. are not able to prove any significant relationship 
between “Product Market Regulation” and “Employment”. Finally, the independent study 
conducted in this paper was not able to move any step further, highlighting that most of 
the effect of the first on the latter is spurious, or in any case very hard to isolate from that 
of other control variables. Most likely, as highlighted by Boeri et al. the reason stands in 
the very high correlation between product and labor market regulations, which is briefly 
analyzed below.  
 
 
4.3 Correlation between Product and Labor Markets Regulation 
 
The correlation between the two variables is very important in this context as highlighted 
above. Unfortunately, due to the aforementioned lack of data, we are not able to conduct 
a study on the correlation of product and labor market institutions over time. A study 
demonstrating the direction of causality between the two is impossible for the same 
reason. Following the example of Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud23 we report below the 
bi-variate correlation between product and labor market regulations in 1998 for 21 OECD 
countries. Given the non-existence of indices representing the overall level of labor 
market regulation, following Boeri et al. and Nicoletti et al. (2000) we have decided to 
proxy it through the degree of EPL. The relationship is represented in the scatterplot 
below.  
The correlation coefficient “ρ” is 0,658387, which demonstrates a relatively strong bi-
variate correlation. The relationship shown below has two very important implications: 
 
1) First, it proves that the insignificant relationship between Product Market 
Regulation and Unemployment/Employment can be attributed not only to a lack 
of explanatory power of the first on the latter, but to multi-collinearity with labor 
market regulation.  
2) Secondly, Figure 10 empirically validates one of the main findings that Blanchard 
and Giavazzi24 developed theoretically: i.e. that a decrease in product market 
regulation naturally leads to (causes) a decrease in labor market regulation. The 
theoretical framework, but, is only partially demonstrated. In fact, we are not able 
to show the direction of causality entailed by the model, but only the fact the two 
variables move together.    
                                                 
23 Nicoletti, Giuseppe, Stefano Scarpetta, and Olivier Boylaud, 2000. “Summary indicators of product 
market regulation with an extension to employment protection legislation”, Economics Department 
Working Paper 226, OECD. 
24 This section refers to Blanchard, Olivier and Francesco Giavazzi, 2003. “Macroeconomic effects of 
regulation and deregulation in goods and labor markets”, Quarterly Journal of Economics,118(3): 
879{909}.  
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Figure 10: Product Market Regulation and Employment Protection Legislation. 1998  
 
The final section of this empirical chapter is dedicated to probably the most important 
relationship that policy-makers care about, i.e. the one between product and labor market 
regulation and economic growth.  
 
 
5 Product & Labor Markets Regulation and Economic 
Growth 
 
Unfortunately, there is a serious lack of data concerning the assessment of product and 
labor market regulation. It was not possible to find any database that contained both 
measures for a sufficient number of years. As explained above, product market regulation 
has been analytically assessed from 1978 until 1998 at intervals of 4-5 years by Nicoletti 
et al. (2001). On the other hand Labor Market Regulation or any of its components (EPL, 
minimum wages, unemployment benefits) were never assessed in an organic way for a 
sufficient number of years. For this reason, we were not able to find a single research 
paper that related economic growth to the two variables at hand. The closer the literature 
has gone to this topic is the paper by Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003)25, where the authors 
study the relationship between product market regulation and productivity growth. 
The paper proves that productivity is increased by reforms promoting private governance 
and competition. Both privatization and entry liberalization are estimated to have a 
positive impact on productivity in all sectors. In manufacturing the second is particularly 
influential, because regulation limiting entry hinders the adoption of existing 
technologies, possibly by reducing competitive pressures, technology spillovers and the 
entry of new high-tech firms. The authors take these findings as a powerful interpretation 
of the observed recent differences in growth patterns across OECD countries, in 
                                                 
25 Nicoletti, Giuseppe and Stefano Scarpetta, 2003. "Regulation, productivity, and growth: OECD 
evidence," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2944, The World Bank. 
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particular between large Continental European economies and the United States. Strict 
product market regulations—and lack of regulatory reforms—are likely to underlie the 
relatively poorer productivity performance of some European countries, especially in 
those industries where Europe has accumulated a technology gap (e.g. ICT-related 
industries). 
These insights are certainly powerful and in line with Aghion and Acemoglu’s findings 
presented in section 1.1, but two elements leave us dissatisfied with the study at hand. 
First, it focuses on productivity growth and not GDP per capita growth: although very 
close to each other, the two variables are not always equal and, for our purpose, a study 
using GDP per capita growth would be preferable. Secondly, it does not show the effects 
of labor market regulation on economic growth.  
To achieve a better understanding of the subject at hand, we present here two studies. The 
first is a cross-section analysis where we regress GDP per capita against the levels of 
product and labor market regulation in 2003. The second study is a bit less 
straightforward: we  take the IMD “Competitiveness Index” as a proxy for product and 
labor market regulation and we conduct a panel data study trying to determine if changes 
in the regulatory environment determine differences in “GDP per capita” growth figures.    
 
5.1 Product and Labor Markets regulation and GDP per Capita26 
 
Given the aforementioned lack of data, we have decided to run a cross-section study for 
the year 2003. We regress nominal GDP per capita against indicators of product and 
labor market regulation for 28 OECD countries according to different model 
specifications. As presented in section 3.4.3, the two sectors tend to have similar 
regulatory levels across countries. This results in a strong multi-collinearity. In order to 
overcome this problem, we tried to use different proxies for product and labor market 
regulation. For the first we used alternatively the aggregate indicator of product market 
regulation developed by Nicoletti et al. (2000), “state control”, “barriers to 
entrepreneurship” and “barriers to trade and investments”; for the second we used 
alternatively the degree of “EPL”, “strictness on individual dismissals” and “collective 
bargaining coverage”. Unfortunately our efforts to exclude multi-collinearity did not lead 
to any valuable result. The level of Labor Market Regulation is significantly negatively 
correlated to the level of GDP per capita when used alone in the regression equation. It is 
instead insignificant when inserted along Product Market Regulation and vice-versa. We 
certainly cannot be satisfied by these results, but the high correlation between the 
variables at hand makes it impossible to estimate their individual effect on GDP per 
capita levels. 
To understand the effects of product and labor market regulation we now adopt a 
different strategy. We use a nation’s competitiveness level, as assessed by the IMD, as an 
instrumental variable for both product and labor market regulation. 
 
   
 
 
                                                 
26 For space reason we only briefly report the findings obtained.  
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5.2 Competitiveness and Economic Growth  
 
5.2.1 The IMD Competitiveness Index 
 
As a first step, it is fundamental to describe the methodology used by IMD in building the 
“Competitiveness Index”. The annual competitiveness rankings are composed of four 
sub-categories: economic performance, government efficiency, business efficiency and 
infrastructure. For these sub-categories there are 83, 77, 69 and 94 individual criteria, 
respectively. The categories themselves are further broken down for a total of  twenty 
sub-factors.  
Each of the twenty sub-factors receives an equal weight of 5%, irrespective of the 
number of criteria composing it. To give each of these elements a score, the IMD uses 
hard and soft data. The former receives a weight of two thirds and the latter accounts for 
the rest. The soft data originates from the so-called annual executive opinion survey. The 
survey is an in-depth 112-point questionnaire sent to business executives and economic 
experts. 
 
5.2.2 The Model  
 
The empirical model to be proposed analyses the statistical relationships between the 
national economic performances and the composite IMD competitiveness index. A panel 
data model is used. Data were collected for 46 different countries, which include 
industrialized, developing and least developed countries. A list of the countries is given 
in Figure 11 below.   In the analysis we use the entire set of countries. However, we also 
conducted our analysis separating the sample into industrialized and developing 
countries. Our findings were unaffected and therefore not reported here.27 
The IMD index was taken for ten consecutive years (1995-2004). Because the overall 
IMD index is an aggregation of separate, but complementary sub-components (i.e. 
Economic Factors, Government Efficiency, Business Efficiency, Infrastructures), it was 
our intention to analyze their individual effect on economic welfare and identify which 
would be the most important factor in driving economic growth. This analysis was not 
possible because the building blocks of the overall index have changed over time. It was 
possible to have consistent sub-indices only for the years (2000-2004), which was 
considered too little of a time span. 
Australia Finland Israel Philippines Taiwan 
Austria France Italy Poland Thailand 
Belgium Germany Japan Portugal Turkey 
Brazil Greece Korea Russia United Kingdom 
Canada Hong Kong Luxembourg Singapore USA 
Chile Hungary Malaysia South Africa Venezuela 
China Mainland Iceland Mexico Spain  
Colombia India Netherlands Sweden  
Czech Republic Indonesia New Zealand Switzerland  
Figure 11: List of countries included in the panel data regression.  
  
                                                 
27 The results are available from the authors upon request. 
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“GDP per capita growth” was used as independent variable,  The Penn World Table 
database was used for the period 1950-2000. IMF data were used to integrate the 
successive four years. The business cycle is stripped out of the real GDP per capita 
growth data by using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. This is done to obtain the structural 
growth rates, which serve as a proxy for potential economic growth of the countries in 
question. To have a ‘clean’ measure of it, the real growth rate data is smoothed over the 
period 1950-2004, even though the index data is limited to the period 1996-2004. Thus, 
only the part of the smoothed data, which lies within the period 1995-2004, is used..  
The independent variable is the “change in the absolute competitive rank from one year 
to the next”. The changes are calculated in such a way, that an improvement in rank (i.e. 
a change in rank from 14 to 12) is represented by a positive number (i.e. +2). Thus, we 
expect to have a positive coefficient for the changes in ranks. Further on, we included 
lags of the changes in rankings. More precisely, they have been lagged by one, two and 
three periods. Simply, an improvement or decrease of competitiveness might not show up 
immediately in the data. It might need time to manifest itself. Country-specific and time-
specific fixed effects were used. 
 
 
5.2.3 Regression Results and Concluding Remarks 
 














:KHUH *'3 LV WKH UHDO JURZWK UDWH SHU FDSLWD DGMXVWHG E\ WKH +RGULFN-Prescott Filter ∆INDEX is the 
change in competitiveness ranking, constructed as explained above and ∆INDEX_XLAG is the index 
change lagged by X periods. 
 
In Figure 12 below are reported the estimation results. The coefficient for ∆INDEX is 
significant up to the second lag, indicating a strong relationship between the ranking in 
the IMD competitiveness index and economic growth. Although the proxy used did not 
contain product and labor market regulation only, with this study we have shown the 
close relationship between economic growth and the friendliness of the regulatory 
environment. We have tried to use separate proxies for product and labor market 
regulation to show their independent effects on economic growth, but either they were 
not available for a sufficient time-span and number of countries or they were so imprecise 
to result insignificant. 
To conclude, the results of this study should be taken only as preliminary. Future research 
attempts should be aimed at showing the independent effects of product and labor market 
regulation on economic growth across countries over time. It is important to have an 
empirical quantification of the two to better direct future policy-making and enact 







Dependent Variable: GDP per capita Growth adjusted by the Hodrick-Prescott filter 
Total pool (balanced) observations: 276  
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
Constant 2.741264 0.030920 88.65790 0.0000  
∆INDEX  0.036429 0.010445 3.487617 0.0006  
∆INDEX_1LAG 0.032011 0.010419 3.072315 0.0024  
∆INDEX_2LAG 0.023600 0.010309 2.289319 0.0230  
∆INDEX_3LAG 0.014842 0.010291 1.442304 0.1506  
Fixed Effects (Country-specific) 
Fixed Effects (time-specific)  
R-squared 0.918993     F-statistic 46.42904   
Adjusted R-squared 0.899200     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000   
Durbin-Watson stat 1.677949     
      
Figure 12: Panel data regression relating “GDP per capita” growth figures adjusted by the Hodrick-Prescott 
Filter to yearly changes in the IMD Competitiveness Ranking, country-specific and time-specific fixed 
effects. 
  
6 Summary and Conclusions 
 
The paper was meant at deepening the reader’s understanding of the relationship between  
economic growth and product/labor market regulation. Although most of the economists 
believe in the positive effects of deregulation, the empirical estimations did not always 
prove to be completely satisfactory. In this context, the paper analyzes and supplement 
previous results for a better understanding of the subject at hand.  
In particular, we have moved some steps forward in showing that the relationship 
between unemployment and productivity growth is positive only in the short-run while it 
becomes closer and closer to zero the longer the time-span under consideration.  
After commenting and analyzing the results obtained by Boeri et al. and Nicoletti et al., 
we have provided an independent estimation of the relationship between employment and 
product market regulation. Although disappointing, it has helped creating a better 
understanding of the problems related to the estimation of these types of relationships.    
Finally, the last section of the paper was dedicated to proving the relationship between 
regulation and economic growth. The approach has been a little unconventional, given 
that we have used the IMD competitiveness index as a proxy for the regulatory 
friendliness of a given country. The results, have appeared to be very promising and we 
hope that future research with more precise data and sharper estimation techniques might 
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